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FTC Enforcement Authority in the Modern 
Era: A Commission in Crisis? 
Brandon Mantilla 
Abstract 
This note provides a brief history of the Federal Trade 
-splitting 
decision in FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC. As the Supreme 
Court prepares to tackle questions surrounding authority to seek 
monetary relief, I contextualize how enforcement authority has 
historically been derived before analyzing how the issue may be 
resolved. Doing so involves engaging several cases that may 
prove consequential in determining the outcome and outlines 
potential legislative solutions to the battle over restitution. Before 
arriving at the most likely scenarios, a view of the budding 
relationship between consumer protections giants the FTC and 
Consumer Financial Protections Bureau (CFPB) provides 
potential for a synergistic solution, but uncertainty surrounding 
both institutions indicates a murky outlook on a purely 
administrative resolution. This in-depth dive, breaking down 
various aspects of the administrative predicament, details the 
common law history of traditional restitution authority in the 
FTC, examines challenges facing the FTC and CFPB, and 
explores how similar issues facing the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) may affect FTC enforcement authority. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress has long sought to protect consumers and has tasked the 
preventing violations of consumer protections laws, among other duties. 
This goal has expressed itself in various forms over time, as the law has 
adapted to fit changing eras in the realm of consumer protections. It has 
resulted in case law that expanded executive authority, the rise of the 
Consumer Financial Protections Bureau in response to financial crisis, and 
a cooperative, symbiotic administrative relationship between the fledgling 
agency and the FTC. 
Recently, however, a judicial trend favoring less expansive 
interpretation of congressionally granted authority has emerged. 
Established, historically unchallenged authority largely and liberally 
granted to federal agencies, has come under fire by textualist and 
structuralist legal minds. In practice, the elimination of enforcement tools 
seen as customary for decades has the potential to result in millions of 
dollars lost due to a drop in operational efficiency and monetary relief. 
Thus, Congress, administrative officials, members of the judiciary, and 
consumers at large await the resolution of this conflict in approach to 
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statutory interpretation begun in Kokesh v. SEC, carried over into FTC v. 
Credit Bureau Center, and likely culminating either in the chambers of the 
Supreme Court or the meeting rooms on Capitol Hill. 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE FTC 
The FTC Act has protected consumers from unfair or deceptive acts 
from simply business competition and the prevention of the growth of 
monopolies.1 
Investigative Authority 
compile information concerning, and to investigate  . . .  the organization, 
business, conduct, practices, and management of any person, partnership, 
or corporation engaged in or whose business affects commerce, excepting 
banks, savings and loan institutions . . . Federal credit unions . . . and 
common carriers . . . 2 More specifically, in cases involving deceptive 
existing documents, oral testimony, or written answers to questions.3 
entities to file annual reports on their business or other practices or conduct 
investigative studies that do not have a specific law enforcement purpose 
under Section 6(b).4  These demands can be contested and reviewed by a 
court.5 Section 21(b) allows internet service providers and other similar 
entities to voluntarily inform the FTC about potential violations without 
liability.6 Beyond domestic powers, the Commission can use all of its 
investigative tools to help foreign law enforcement agencies in consumer 
protections matters under section 6(j).7 
 
1 Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act: 
Good Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U.L. REV. 1139, 1141 (1992). 
2 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (2020). 
3 F.T.C., A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission s Investigative, Law 
Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-
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Enforcement Authority 
rity to enjoin deceptive or unfair acts or 
practices arises from section 5(a).8 
representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead a consumer 
9 On the other hand, an unfair 
is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed 
10 
One method the FTC uses is its power to conduct adjudicative 
proceedings.11 Firstly, however, the Commission must have reason to 
believe someone has violated a law.12 Once this standard has been met, a 
complaint is issued detailing the charges.13 Next, the defendant can elect 
to settle, singing a consent agreement that does not admit fault, consent to 
entry of a final order, and wait thirty days for a decision on whether the 
order becomes final.14 Otherwise, defendants may contest the charges. 
When this occurs, an adjudicative proceeding reminiscent of a trial result 
in an initial decision which recommends dismissal or issuance of a cease-
and-desist order.15  Respondents may appeal to any United States court of 
appeals with jurisdiction.16 If the court of appeals upholds, it then issues 
its own enforcement order.17 Either party may then file a petition for writ 
of certiorari to the Supreme Court.18 
Commission orders become final sixty days after they are issued, and 
a violation of a final order may result in a civil penalty being levied against 
knowledge that such act or practice is unfair or deceptive and is unlawful.19 
Under section 19, if a reasonable person would consider the violating 
conduct fraudulent or dishonest, the Commission may pursue redress for 
any injuries consumers may have suffered.20 
 
8 Id. 
9 James C. Miller, FTC Policy Statement on Deception, F.T.C. (Oct. 14, 1983), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptions
tmt.pdf. 
10 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2020). 








19 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B)(2) (2018). 
20 Id. § 57b(a). 
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Most often, however, the FTC exercises its authority under section 
13(b) to pursue permanent injunctions issued directly by a court, skipping 
the adjudicative proceeding altogether.21 Section 13 also, the Commission 
believes, grants it to seek various kinds of monetary relief such as 
rescission or restitution, along with injunctive relief.22 Due to its 
he section in its efforts 
to protect consumers.23 
FTC rulemaking authority on unfair and deceptive acts is derived from 
section 18 of the FTC Act, which allows the Commission to create rules 
or deceptive 
24 These rules must allow for 
limited cross-examination in an informal hearing and the Commission 
must demonstrate why it considers a targeted practice to be prevalent.25 
Enforcement Tools 
The agency operates by issuing cease-and-desist orders to enjoin 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices. However, because these orders did 
not serve as effective deterrents, the FTC began to claim that it had the 
power to order restitution for consumers victimized by unfair practices.26 
Although courts never agreed, with the only court to consider the issue 
adding section 13(b) to the FTC Act with the intention of allowing 
preliminary or permanent injunctions against violators of section 5 of the 
Act.27 
Initially, the FTC did not utilize section 13(b) as it does today. On the 
contrary, the agency was criticized by the General Accounting Office for 
failure to take advantage of the newly enacted amendment.28 Meanwhile, 
it continued to push for an interpretation of the cease-and-desist power that 
included the power to order restitution.29 
Subsequently, Congress enacted section 19 of the Act.30 One year after 
section 13(b) was enacted, this new section finally granted the FTC 
express power to collect restitution for victims, provided the agency can 
meet certain standards of proof and a statute of limitations. The 
 
21 F.T.C., supra note 3. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(2). 
25 F.T.C., supra, note 3. 
26 Ward, supra note 1, at 1142. 
27 Id. at 1142. 
28 Id. at 1179. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 1142. 
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introduction of section 19 clear
that section 13(b) did not provide for consumer redress. Section 19, 
interpreted section 13(b) to grant ancillary equitable relief power to the 
FTC in conjunction with injunctions.31 The spread of the implied power to 
receive remedies such as restitution and rescission through section 13(b) 
left section 19 essentially redundant. The path to restitution carved out by 
the judiciary has thus allowed 
proof and statute of limitations requirements for decades.32 
The differences between the two sections are unsurprisingly 
substantial. The FTC has relied on section 13(b) and would be forced to 
drastically change its approach to enforcement if the judiciary removed 
the tool it granted the agency over three decades ago. To grasp the potential 
ramifications of such a decision, one must first look to the language of the 
statute. 
Section 13(b) 
Section 13(b) authorizes the 
[that] is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by 
33 
Section 19 
 . . .  
[which] may include, but shall not be limited to, rescission or reformation 
of contracts, the refund of money or return of property, [and] the payment 
-issued final cease and desist 
orders or any rule regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices.34 This 
section, however, includes a statute of limitations barring actions brought 
35 
In all, section 19 would place a heavier burden on the FTC to prosecute 
cases quickly and provide more evidence than the lower standard of proof 
required for a preliminary injunction under section 13(b). This burden 
would bar a significant amount of the claims brought by the agency, 
 
31 Id. at 1143. 
32 Id. 
33 15 USC § 53(b)(2) (2018). 
34 Id. § 57b(b). 
35 Id. § 57b(d). 
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possibly forcing it to rely on its own slow-moving administrative 
adjudication process in place of restitution granted in federal courts.36 
 
complex and arduous. This adjudication proceeding includes pre-
complaint investigation, rapid fact and expert discovery, pretrial motions, 
lengthy trials similar to bench trials in federal courts, filing of voluminous 
last reply findings by the parties, a nonbinding initial decision, a complex 
appeal process, and a potential appeal to a circuit court of appeals that 
generally defers to the Commission.37 Resorting to this option would be 
costly and inefficient for the FTC, possibly leading more defendants to 
 
Singer and Amy Travel 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in FTC v. H.N. Singer 
grant restitution as part of a permanent injunction in section 13(b) cases, 
38 This 
section 13(b). The Seventh Circuit plainly recognized this right in 1989 
with its holding in FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc. 
In Amy Travel, the Seventh Circuit relied on Singer and a pair of prior 
Seventh Circuit cases, FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc. and 
FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc.39 In World Travel, the court was permitted to 
grant interlocutory relief as well as permanent injunctive relief, while in 
with it the power to issue whatever ancillary equitable relief is necessary 
to the effective exercise of the granted power.40 In no unclear words, the 
13(b), the statutory grant of authority to the district court to issue 
permanent injunctions includes the power to order any ancillary equitable 
 
36 Kelley Drye, Section 13 (b)log: Business As Usual? FTC Practice in the Wake of 
Shire ViroPharma and Credit Bureau Center, AD LAW ACCESS (Oct. 22, 2019), 
https://www.adlawaccess.com/2019/10/articles/section-13-blog-business-as-usual-ftc-
practice-in-the-wake-of-shire-viropharma-and-credit-bureau-center/. 
37 See generally J. Robert Robertson, Administrative Trials at the Federal Trade 
Commission in Competition Cases, 14 SEDONA CONF. J. 101, 105, 112 (2013). 
38 FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982). 
39 FTC v. Army Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571 (7th Cir. 1989). 
40 FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1989); FTC v. World Travel 
Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 1026 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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41 The 
restitution in all Seventh Circuit section 13(b) cases. 
Amy Travel
circuit courts of appeal, including the Eleventh Circuit in FTC v. Gem 
Merchandising Corp., the Eighth Circuit in FTC v. Sec. Rare Coin & 
Bullion Corp., the Second Circuit in FTC v. Bronson Partners LLC, the 
Tenth Circuit in FTC v. Freedom Communications Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
in FTC v. Pantron I Corp., and the Fourth Circuit in FTC v. Ross. Until 
recently, the position has gone largely unchallenged. However, a few 
recent cases, especially FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, stand to 
change the way the FTC approaches its enforcement authority. The next 
section of this paper will discuss Credit Bureau Center in depth, 
demonstrating why it poses a large, looming threat to the FTC not just in 
the Seventh Circuit, but across the entire nation. 
III. FTC V. CREDIT BUREAU CENTER, LLC 
Factual Background 
Credit Bureau Center is a credit-monitoring service owned by Michael 
Brown.42 This service attracted customers by automatically enrolling them 
in a $29.94 monthly subscription upon application for the supposedly free 
credit report and score service.43 This fact was buried in a disclaimer in 
small font Customers were not alerted of their enrollment until they 
received a letter notifying them after they had already been enrolled.44 
Meanwhile, Brown contracted Danny Pierce, who then subtracted 
Andrew Lloyd, to advertise false rental properties on Craigslist and 
credit score.45 After generating $6.8 million in revenue and failing to offer 
refunds (instead often offering reduced prices in an attempt to keep the 
customer subscribed to his service), Brown was found liable and a 
permanent injunction was issued and upheld.46 The opinion takes the 
different direction.47 
 
41 Army Travel Serv., 875 F.2d at 571. 
42 FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir. 2019). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 768. 
46 Id. at 767-68. 
47 Id. at 766. 
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A Statutory Breakdown 
Jud
FTC has not only section 13(b) at its disposal, but quick enforcement under 
section 19 as well, which may have expressly granted the agency the 
ability to seek restitution payments.48 Quickly shifting to a breakdown of 
section 13(b), the court comes to its primary argument  the language of 
section 13(b) does not provide for a restitution remedy and the FTC Act 
does not lend itself well to the interpretation of an implied restitution 
remedy stemming from section 13(b). The court notes the nature of 
restitution as a remedy for past actions rather than one intended to prevent 
language indicates.49 The conclusion that the ability to receive restitution 
for past violations depends on whether present or future violations are 
occurring does not sit well with the court, as one might expect, and exposes 
50 
In continuance of its textualist approach, the court points to the 
spectively.51 
enforcement tools, in addition to its striking lack of any mention of 
additional equitable remedies, strongly indicate that section 13(b) was 
never intended to grant the same powers as do the other tools.52 
and saving clauses can only preserve existing remedies.53 The court does, 
however, see a role for each enforcement mechanism. Cease and desist 
 54 In order to reach this 
result, the court must first revisit its past rulings on the issue at hand in the 
wake of the Supreme Court rulings issued since Amy Travel. 
 
48 Id. at 771. 
49 Id. at 772. 
50 Id. at 773. 
51 Id. at 773 (quoting § 45(1) (2018); §57(b)(b) (2018)). 
52 Id. at 774. 
53 See id. at 775 (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. V. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 
446). 
54 Id. at 774. 
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The Impact of Meghrig 
After a brief rundown of the caselaw that resulted in Amy Travel, the 
court explains a trend, in its view, that has reigned the expansive implied 
restitution remedies of Porter v. Warner Holding Co., Mitchell v. Robert 
DeMario Jewelry, Inc., and Amy Travel back in.55 This trend is best 
exemplified by t Meghrig v. KFC Western, 
Inc., a case somewhat similar to Credit Bureau Center. 
Meghrig centers on whether a provision of the Resource Conservation 
order p
clean-up costs.56 Because these remedies are forward-looking, prohibitory 
and mandatory injunctions rather than remedies for past costs, the Court 
in Meghrig declined to recognize an implied restitution remedy.57 
The Meghrig court also looked to some familiar factors in determining 
that no implied restitution remedy existed. It looked to statutory 
prerequisites for imminence of the danger and a mechanism that halts 
citizen suits if the government pursues action and requires a ninety-day 
notice before the suit.58 These factors and a lack of statutes of limitations 
or reasonable cost requirements textually lead to a conclusion that the 
section is not a restitution mechanism, but a solely injunctive one.59 Since 
Meghrig, Judge Skye posits, the Supreme Court has ceased the 
presumption of congressionally authorized judicial supplementation of 
remedies, and now views express provision of one form of enforcement to 
mean the preclusion of others.60 
The Seventh Circuit believes Meghrig limited the impact of the old 
line of cases on implied restitution essentially to their facts and every 
reason Meghrig was decided as it was applies here.61 The textual reading 
and structuralist view of each statute shows in each that the plain meaning 
does not support restitution and other sections of the statute serve the role 
courts have tried to pigeonhole section 13(b) into.62 As in Meghrig, a 
temporal requirement of current events should not logically be a 
prerequisite for restitution.63 
 
55 See id. at 780. 
56 Id. (quoting § 6972(a)). 
57 Id. (citing Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996)) 
58 Id. (citing Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996)). 
59 Id. (citing Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996)). 
60 See id. at 772. 
61 Id. at 782-83. 
62 Id. at 783. 
63 Id. 
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and notice requirement strike again as factors toward a conclusion that 
restitution has not been authorized, implicitly or otherwise.64 
Credit Bureau Center concludes its analysis by failing to find a 
material distinction between the case at hand and Meghrig based on the 
identity of the plaintiff as a state actor, and acknowledging that stare 
decisis and the initiation of a circuit split are not sufficient reasons to 
uphold the restitution remedy.65 Instead, the court prioritizes respect for 
the role of Congress in legislating and the language of statutes.66 In the 
eyes of the Seventh Circuit, Meghrig has made Amy Travel 
with the FTC Act.67 
IV. A BROADER PROBLEM FOR THE FTC 
FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc. 
As acknowledged in the majority opinion in Credit Bureau Center, the 
other circuit courts, as well. Although FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc. is a 
competition case and not a consumer protections case, the Third Circuit 
language of section 13(b). That court found that 
68 
FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC 
This case was decided in favor of the FTC. However, a separate 
concurrence has raised some interesting concerns for the FTC. Along with 
many of the same concerns expressed in Credit Bureau Center, the AMG 
concurrence believes that Kokesh v. SEC  
reasoning: that restitution under § 69 
In Kokesh, the Supreme Court ruled that disgorgement  a form of 
restitution by the SEC was a penalty rather than an equitable remedy.70 
This opens the door for an entirely diff
 
64 Id. at 783-84. 
65 Id. at 785-86. 
66 Id. at 775. 
67 Id. at 786. 
68 FTC v. Shire Viropharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 153 (3rd Cir. 2019). 
69 FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417, 429 (9th Cir. 2018) (O Scannlain, 
J., concurring). 
70 Kokesh v. S.E.C., 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1640 (2017). 
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reasoning that restitution is available under section 13(b) as an ancillary 
equitable remedy. AMG has since been granted writ of certiorari from the 
Supreme Court, allowing the Court to decide whether the holding of the 
Ninth Circuit in AMG Capital Management or the Seventh Circuit in 
Credit Bureau Center will prevail. 
V. THE CFPB 
History 
Following the financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. One effect of the legislation 
was the formation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a federal 
agency conceived by Senator Elizabeth Warren during her years as a 
professor. The agency aims to protect consumers from unfair, deceptive, 
and abusive practices through enforcement of consumer financial 
protection laws.71  
unions with over $10 billion in assets, as well as many nonbank consumer 
financial service providers, such as mortgage lenders and servicers, 
student lenders and servicers, payday lenders and certain participants in 
72 
The agency is a compilation of various functions and responsibilities 
previously separated among different groups finally shifted under one 
governing body.73 It receives funding from the Federal Reserve, has a 
director appointed to a five year term who is not accountable to the 
president and requires a steep showing of cause for removal, and executes 
its daily functions with little oversight.74 Beyond regulation, the CFPB can 
75 With its sights set on 
improving protections for the most vulnerable, the CFPB has 
accomplished a number of valuable feats including but not limited to the 
creation of a financial database allowing consumers to research loan 
companies as well as new rules for mortgage and payday loans.76 
 
71 Jon Eisenberg, An Early History of the CFPB: Part 1, LAW 360 (Mar. 18, 2014) 
(available via LexisNexis). 
72 Id. 
73 Daniel Bush, What is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, anyway?, PBS 
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CFPB enforcement relief often includes: orders barring continuing 
and future violations, including cease and desist orders or injunctions; 
governance and review of the offending areas, often consisting of a review 
of the compliance program used by the product or services and 
improvement of procedures designed to prevent future violations, usually 
involving a mandate to retain outside consultants and to report to the board 
and CFPB; restitution paid to consumers harmed, potentially reviewed by 
a third-party; and payment of a civil money penalty.77 Violators often are 
required to have all board members assume full responsibility for ensuring 
the integration of proper procedures in avoidance of future violations.78 
Restitution 
The CFPB has been granted statutory authority to seek remedies 
including disgorgement or compensation for unjust 
79 These remedies far exceed those 
authorized for many administrative agencies, notably the aforementioned 
FTC and SEC. In fact, the CFPB requires payment of restitution in most 
cases it settles.80 
An Unfriendly Welcome 
Concerns regarding the constitutionality of its single-director structure and 
vague, ambiguous language dictating its core responsibilities have 
surrounded the agency since its inception. Many of the central designs, 
including its exemption from congressionally apportioned funding, lead 
enforcer who cannot be fired by the executive branch at will, and deference 
received from courts, have been under fire since its inception.81 These 
aspects arguably violate the separation of powers doctrine in their attempt 
to keep the agency politically impartial. These arguments have played out 
in courtrooms. 
Seila Law LLC v. CFPB is set to determine critical issues for the CFPB 
going into the future. Primarily, the case will determine whether the 
 





81 Iain Murray, The Case Against the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://cei.org/content/case-against-cfpb. 
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power within the executive branch.82 A potential ruling determining the 
structure unconstitutional creates increasing uncertainty on the future of 
the Bureau. If the structure is improper, as even CFPB director Kathy 
Kraninger now argues, the Supreme Court must decide how to rectify the 
issue.83 The Court must determine whether it can sever the violating 
provision, 12 U.S.C. §5491(c)(3), from the Dodd-Frank Act.84 If the 
structure is unconstitutional, not only could its independence be at stake, 
but its ability to operate at all in its present form due to enforcement actions 
being led by an unconstitutionally appointed director. 
However, the Court can extend its decision even further. In CFPB v. 
RD Legal, U.S. District Judge Loretta Preska held that severability clauses 
do not permit courts to rewrite statutes, and the Supreme Court may agree 
that to simply sever the violating provision would be judicial overreach.85 
In that event, the CFPB could be struck down in its entirety.86 
VI. HOW THE FTC AND CFPB INTERACT 
Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act 
The FTC, even before the creation of the CFPB, did not have 
regulatory authority over consumer protection with regards to banks and 
credit unions.87 In creating the CFPB, the Dodd-Frank Act shifted 
consumer protections authority over banks and credit unions from federal 
88 
Dodd-Frank, however, gave the CFPB other responsibilities as well. The 
CFPB also has jurisdiction over any company involved in offering or 
providing a consumer financial product or service as well as companies 
who are service providers to those that offer or provide consumer financial 
products or services.89 This shift in authority from the FTC to the CFPB 
 
82 Kelsey Ramírez, Supreme Court to Determine CFPB Constitutionality in March, 
HOUSINGWIRE (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/supreme-court-to-
determine-cfpb-constitutionality-in-march/. 
83 See id. 
84 Id. 
85 Alison Frankel, CFPB Just Told SCOTUS it s Unconstitutional. What Does That 








89 Public Law 111-517, Title X, §1002(6). 
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Act and similar federal consumer financial laws against companies.90 The 
ow include sole authority to 
enforce laws regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices and concurrent 
jurisdiction with the CFPB in enforcing the Fair Credit Reporting Act.91 
The two agencies are also tasked with coordinating with each other 
throughout the rulemaking process.92 They must negotiate with the goal of 
avoiding duplicate or conflicting rules.93 This shall be handled by 
consulting each other prior to each rule proposal grounded in concurrent 
94 Interestingly, 
the CFPB is permitted to enforce rules on unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices that rely on FTC authority, and vice versa.95 
expanded remedy arsenal allows the federal government to pursue 
remedies the FTC has never had explicit authority to seek, and is not 
 
FTC-CFPB Memorandum of Understanding 
The FTC and CFPB are required, by statute, to come to an agreement 
regarding how to handle concurrent jurisdiction. 
The Bureau and the Federal Trade Commission shall negotiate an 
agreement for coordinating with respect to enforcement actions by each 
agency regarding the offering or provision of consumer financial products 
or services by a covered person  . . .  or service providers thereto.  The 
agreement shall include procedures for notice to the other agency, where 
feasible prior to initiating a civil action to enforce any Federal law 
regarding the offering or provision of consumer financial products or 
services.96 
In that agreement, the two governing bodies agree to conduct joint 
investigations and share resources where appropriate. They also agree to 
discuss legal issues presented in enforcement actions at least once per year 
in order to ensure a consistent approach is maintained in enforcing 
consumer protections laws.97 The agencies, in an effort not to initiate 
 






96 Title X, Section 1024(c)(3)(A). 
97 Memorandum of Understanding Between The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
And The Federal Trade Commission, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Feb. 25, 2019), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation_agreements/ftc-
cfpb_mou_225_0.pdf. 
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double enforcement against violators, must maintain records of 
investigations and enforcement matters so that they may inquire of each 
other and receive a prompt response on what action, if any, has been taken 
against a violator.98 This includes setting deadlines for reporting of the 
commencement of investigations, filing of complaints, resolution of a 
proceeding, and issuance of a no action letter.99 The agreement permits 
each to intervene in a court proceeding initiated by the other on matters 
within concurrent jurisdiction, so long as proper notice of intervention is 
given.100 
The agencies must notify each other prior to issuing rule proposals, 
and meet once per year to discuss publication of policy statements, 
bulletins, advisory opinions, and the like.101 When the agencies seek to 
conduct examinations of covered entities, they are to coordinate 
schedules.102 Upon termination, they share reports and confidential 
supervisory information.103 Meetings are also held to coordinate strategy 
and operations, including routing of complaints to proper recipients, 
initiatives to inform and empower members of the military on consumer 
financial products, discuss ongoing and anticipated research, and many 
more objectives.104 
The duo has already begun to work in concert for the specific purpose 
instance, the FTC and CFPB coordinated investigative efforts in a 
proceeding against Equifax.105 There, the CFPB was able to use its 
remedial authority to receive an order for $100 million in civil monetary 
penalties.106 In response to potential loss of restitution authority, the FTC 
could conduct more and more joint efforts with the CFPB in order to rely 
on its authority. 
However, this may not be an optimal solution in the long term. 
Without proper authority to collect restitution of its own, the FTC could 
come to rely on the CFPB to the point where the FTC no longer serves as 
an efficient enforcer of consumer protections laws. In essence, the FTC 
would be merely an investigative partner for the CFPB in cases involving 
 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 4-6. 
100 Id. at 6-7. 
101 Id. at 9. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 10 
104 Id. at 11. 
105 Jonathan B. Engel & Silki Patel, Will Questions About FTC Enforcement Authority 
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areas of concurrent jurisdiction. Because such a set up would likely bog 
down both agencies and be poor use of federal resources, it is difficult to 
imagine it as more than a short-term resolution while lawmakers seek to 
 
Additionally, there are many areas in which the sibling agencies do 
not share jurisdiction. Laws regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
fall solely with
not rely on CFPB authority to pursue restitution. Ultimately, the FTC will 
likely need to look toward a Supreme Court holding overturning Credit 
Bureau Center or a legislative solution that more permanently solves the 
issues surrounding Section 13b, as it will not find comfort under the wing 
 
Given the uncertainty regarding the status of the CFPB going forward 
as well as the looming chipping away of enforcement tools facing the FTC, 
the federal consumer financial protections landscape could possibly be on 
the precipice of change and look vastly different within the next several 
years. 
VII. SUPREME COURT OPPORTUNITIES TO SETTLE SECTION 13(B) 
The Supreme Court will have an opportunity to settle the questions 
surrounding the controversial FTCA section. The opportunity has arrived 
via the aforementioned FTC v. AMG Capital Management, LLC, which 
decided Credit Bureau Center
Circu AMG Capital 
Management 
enforcement authority under 13(b).107 
Another pivotal case that could have shed light on the future of 13(b) 
is Liu v. SEC. Although not a case that deals directly with section 13(b), 
the issues and statute it grapples with it are similar enough that the 
Solicitor General of the United States in a brief for AMG Capital 
Management sought a stay of consideration in that case because the 
Liu overlap.108 The debate in 
Liu 
enforcement actions, a conversation first broached in Kokesh v. SEC. A 
 
107 See FTC v. AMG Capital Management, LLC, 910 F.3d 417 (2018). 
108 Brief for the Respondent at 7, FTC v. AMG Capital Management, LLC, 910 F.3d 417 
(2018), No. 19-508 (Dec. 13, 2019); Leonard L. Gordon & Michael A. Munoz, Statutory 
Dreams or Equitable Nightmares: A Trifecta of Cases Before the Supreme Court Threaten 
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footnote from Kokesh, initiated the momentum that culminated in Liu, 
noting that, 
[N]othing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on 
whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC 
enforcement proceedings or on whether courts have properly applied 
disgorgement principles in this context. The sole question presented in 
this case is whether disgorgement, as applied in SEC enforcement 
actions, is subject to § 109 
This footnote opened the floodgates for what was to come, leaving 
the question of whether disgorgement was a proper remedy under the 
fendants in SEC enforcement 
actions. Ultimately, the Supreme Court in Liu held that disgorgement 
victims are equitable relief permissible under §78u(d)(5).110 
The defendants in Liu garnered $27 million in funding from Chinese 
investors as part of the EB-5 program allowing foreign investors to gain 
entry into the United States in return for a substantial investment.111 
However, the defendants failed to properly invest the funds, instead 
misappropriating a majority of the funds.112 Consequently, the SEC 
sought and was granted disgorgement of the funds, and the district court 
also issued civil penalty of $8.2 million, along with barring them from 
participating in the EB-5 program in the future.113 
Historically, the SEC has used disgorgement often and to great 
effect.114 In fact, 74% of all monetary relief obtained by the SEC was 
gained through disgorgement in 2019.115 Its use has not been questioned 
for decades, despite never actually being explicitly authorized by 
statute.116 Thus, Liu 
enforcement approach. 
However, as the Solicitor General noted, the relevant SEC statute is 
 
109  Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642 (2017). 
110 Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. ___ (2020). 
111 Securities Litigation Alert, Liu v. SEC: Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Challenge to 






115 John C. Scalzo ET AL., Liu v. SEC: U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Review SEC s 
Ability to Seek Disgorgement, REED SMITH LLP (Dec. 2, 2019), 
https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2019/12/liu-v-sec-us-supreme-court-agrees-
to-review-secs-ability-to-seek. 
116 Securities Litigation Alert, supra note 111. 
140 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:122 
arguments for how Congress has authorized disgorgement relies on the 
Sarbanes-
equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of 
117 Therefore, according to the SEC, disgorgement is 
authorized as an equitable remedy. 
Likewise, a more textualist approach similar to the one employed in 
Credit Bureau Center by the Seventh Circuit, could acknowledge that 
disgorgement (or restitution) is not an equitable remedy. If restitution is 
deemed not to be an equitable remedy, as the Supreme Court decided of 
disgorgement in Kokesh, it may be difficult for the FTC to argue that it 
is implied as an ancillary equitable power accompanying its permanent 
unclear, as the Court in Liu allowed the SEC to continue its 
disgorgement practice with limitations, throwing the administrative 
agency a lifeline of sorts.118 Thus, although the statutory issues in Liu, 
AMG Capital Management, and Credit Bureau Center may seem 
intertwined, the Supreme Court does not seem to have decided all three 
in one fell swoop. Having vacated its prior grant of the petition in Credit 
Bureau Center, the Court is preparing to cast final judgment on the 
AMG Capital 
Management.119 
VIII. VERRULING  THE COURT, POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE 
SOLUTIONS 
Congress may have the final word on these issues, regardless of how 
the Supreme Court rules. As a number of courts in the relevant cases have 
discussed, Congress understands how to authorize these remedies 
explicitly, and has done so in each statute. In the case of the FTC Act, 
restitution is explicitly authorized in Section 19. This remedy is simply 
 
117 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5); Jonathan Rosenberg ET AL., Dismantling the SEC s Federal 
Court Disgorgement Authority, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL (Jan. 10, 2020), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/01/10/dismantling-the-secs-federal-court-
disgorgement-authority/?slreturn=20200023142928. 
118 Kyle DeYoung ET AL., An Analysis of the Supreme Court s Decision in Liu v. SEC, 
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https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/04/an-analysis-of-the-supreme-courts-decision-
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119 See John E. Villafranco & Bez Stern, Supreme Court Vacates its Prior Grant of the 
FTC s Petition for Certiorari in FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, KELLEY DRYE AD 




2021] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 141 
less appealing to the Commission because it is subject to a statute of 
limitations and requires administrative proceedings that take longer to 
case for the SEC.120 If Congress is not satisfied with section 19 as a 
remedial tool, it may amend the act to explicitly authorize restitution in a 
more satisfactory manner. 
Although legislation has not been put forth explicitly authorizing 
expanded restitution for the FTC, largely because only one court of 
appeals has ruled against the FTC, the same is not true for the SEC. Two 
bills have been introduced in Congress in response to Kokesh.121 The first, 
brought forth by Sens. Mark R. Warner (D-Va.) and John Kennedy (R-
La.), would essentially cement Kokesh 122 The 
bill would authorize a five-year statute of limitations for disgorgement and 
a ten-year statute of limitations for restitution.123 The other bill, introduced 
by Rep. Ben McAdams (D-Utah), would grant the SEC express 
disgorgement  authority by amending Section 21(d)(5) to explicitly allow 
disgorgement rather than simply equitable relief.124 
Far from the only examples of Congressional power to circumvent the 
courts, these bills nonetheless provide excellent examples on what 
Congress may do in the event of a Supreme Court ruling against the FTC, 
and certainly the SEC. Despite the legislative process taking some time, a 
legislative solution would likely prove to be the best option, as Congress 
is the body of government with the most control. The FTC is created by 
Congress, governed by legislature, and can be immunized from judicial 
overreach with proper statutory drafting. With an express grant of 
authority in clear, precise language, Congress could put the issue to rest 
permanently. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The FTC is in the midst of a bureaucratic tornado, one it likely never 
saw coming after decades of unchallenged enforcement activity. Its 
authority to circumvent the burdensome administrative proceedings and 
statutory restrictions by invoking section 13(b) has served a critical 
function for the Commission. Without it, some confusion about how the 
government may pursue enforcement against violators of consumer 
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protection laws. Unless the FTC Act is amended, that objective may fall 
it a capable fill-in or ally to the FTC in its effort to protect consumers. 
Given the political and legal criticisms and uneven entrance into the 
stage as an emerging executive agency, the future of the CFPB is far from 
certain. Questions surrounding its structure and constitutionality loom 
large over the administrative landscape, making reliance on a mere shifting 
of roles to the CFPB a difficult solution for the federal government to 
embrace. Thus, a prudent approach may entail allowing the other branches 
of government to settle the discussion amongst themselves. 
In the short term, the discrepancy in FTC enforcement authority may 
cause some trouble for the agency nationwide. Many defendants are sure 
Credit Bureau Center. 
Meanwhile, a similar battle rages on in regard to SEC enforcement actions. 
As the issue of restitution and disgorgement await an impending 
resolution, excessive litigation on the most basic issues look to hamper the 
courts. 
However, a number of resolutions may put an end to the confusion 
surrounding 13(b). The judicial branch provides the promise of resolution 
in the form of FTC v. AMG Capital Management, and may have laid the 
groundwork for such in Liu v. SEC. The Supreme Court could end the use 
of motions based on lack of authority facing the FTC with its decision in 
AMG Capital Management. However, in the event that the Court decides 
against the FTC, the climate may yet remain uncertain. 
To maintain administrative efficiency and utility, Congress may seek 
to 
industry-shifting decision. Whether in the form of bills currently making 
their way through the halls of Congress or another bill designed to address 
the concerns of a potential Supreme Court decision, the legislative branch 
is likely to have final say on the matter if the Court does not. 
